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CHAPTER

I

The study of religionand the riseof atheism:
conflictor confirmation?
MichaelJ BuckleyS.j

INTRODUCTION

TO THE

QUESTION

'Religion' and 'theology' are not terms with fixed meanings and invariant applications. They are rather copies or commonplaces - not in the
sense of the familiar and the trite, but in the classical sense of linguistic
variables, terms ambiguous and capacious enough to house a vast diversity of meanings, arguments, and referents.' The interconnection of such
topics constitutes neither a determined problem nor an exact proposition.
It constitutes what John Dewey called 'a problematic situation', an indeterminate area out of which problems and their resolutions can emerge
only if these ambiguous terms ;ire given specific meanings and definite
applications within particular inquiries. 2 Recognising the ambiguity of both
'religion' and 'theology', this paper proposes to obtain a greater purchase
on the problematic situation they together delimit, first, by offering a few
precisions on 'religion' as its meaning developed through history co reach its
generic consensus in late modernity; and then, by exploring how the scientific study of religion, so understood, came to engage one of the arguments
of modern theology: the existence or non-existence of God.
In a remarkable review of the scientific study of religion over a fifty-year
period, Mircea Eliade provides a benchmark for chis project by selecting
1912 as a date of particular consequence. 3 That year, five stars rose in the
firmament. Emile Durkheim published his Formes elementairesde la vie
religieuse.Sigmund Freud 'was correcting the proofs of Totem und Tabu, co
be issued in book form the following year', and Carl Jung was publishing his
' See Richard P. McKean, 'Creativity, and the Commonplace', in Mark Backman, ed., Rhetoric:
Essaysin Invention and Discovery(Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987), pp. 25-36. For commonplaces as linguistic variables, see Aristotle, Topics,1.13-18,w5a20-w8a36; Rhetoric1.2.1358a.io-35;
2.23.1398a27-8.
1
See John Dewey, Logic:The Theoryof Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. !05-8.
J Mircea Eliade, 'The History of Religions in Retrospect: 1912and After', in The Quest:History and
Meaning in Religion(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 12-36.
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Wandlungenund Symboleder Libido. Raffaele Pettazoni's first monograph,
La religioneprimitiva in Sardegna,appeared that same year, and Wilhelm
Schmidt completed the first of the twelve volumes in his monumental study

Der Ursprungder Gottesidee.
In these five works, four very different methodologies advanced towards
greater academic acceptance and influential presence in the scientific study
of religion: the sociological, the psychological, the ethnological and the historical. Eliade paints all this in broad brush strokes, depicting the intrinsic
value and perduring authority of each of his chosen authors. What he does
not examine or evaluate, however, forms the interest of this essay. For these
seminal and even paradigmatic studies from the early twentieth century
bore witness, in all of their diversity of methods, to an agreement and a
controversy about religion: an agreement about the genus chat 'religion'
had become over the centuries, and a controversy over the collateral that
religion so understood would offer to belief and unbelief.

RELIGION:

FROM
OF

VIRTUE
1

THINGS'

TO
4

CATEGORY

To chart something of the lengthy journey by which 'religion' reached its
generic and accepted understanding by 1912, chis essay proposes - as they
do on the Mississippi - to take three soundings. It will drop a plumb
line into the medieval controversies of Thomas Aquinas; then, gauge the
modification of chat tradition in the heady days of Baroque scholasticism;
and finally allow Eliade's Five to exemplify the 'religion' secured by lace
modernity. Such discrete measurements might supplement, rather than
repeat, the magisterial studies of such scholars as Wilfred Cantwell Smith
and Peter Harrison.
For Thomas Aquinas, 'religio'- irrespective of how one comes down on
its etymology- 'properly denotes or implies a relationship to God (proprie
importat ordinem ad Deum)'.5 More specifically, it designates a habit or a
virtue by which one gives God what is due to God, and in this way lives 'in
an appropriate relationship with God'. 6 But since it is impossible to render
to God all that is owed to the divine goodness, religion always limps.
Religion is like justice in that it renders to another what is his or her due.
Because of its inherent inadequacy, however, it does not simply identify
For the history of 'religion', see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion
(Minneapolis: Forness Press, 1991), pp. 15-50.
6 Ibid., 2-2.81.2.
s Summa theologiae2-2.81.1.
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with justice, but is a virtue joined to justice, i.e., a potential part of justice.7
God enters into the constitution of religion not as its direct object, not chat
to which it immediately attends, but as the end or purpose of what religi.o
does properly attend to, i.e., any human action or thing chat embodies the
worship and service of God. Such practices could be external activities like
public adoration or sacrifice or vowing or, more importantly and primarily,
internal actions such as devotion and prayer. 8 These individual or social
actions and cultic units are not religion; they are the acts and objects of
religion. They look to God; religion looks co chem. Thus religiois a moral
rather than a theological virtue, taking such human acts and practices as
its direct objecc.9
For chis reason, unlike the use of this term in the English Enlightenment, religion could never substitute in Aquinas for faith, though to be
'true religion' it had to be grounded on true faith. w But religion was comprehensive; it could command the acts ofall the virtues and human activities
insofar as they were directed to the service and honour of God. 11 William T.
Cavanaugh narrows the range and acts of religion considerably by maintaining chat religi.ofor St Thomas 'presupposes a context of ecclesial practices which are both communal and particular to the Christian Church'.
It certainly includes these practices, but there is no justification for limiting religioin this fashion. Religiocan command a single and private act
of worship or service as well as a communal one. Cavanaugh further and
needlessly insists that 'religion refers specifically to the liturgical practices
of the Church'. 12 Again these are certainly included in Aquinas's religio,
7

8

9

10

11

12

Ibid., 2-2.80.prol and art. 1; 81.5,ad 3.
Ibid., 2-2.81.1.ad 1; 81-4-ad 4; 81.7='Mens autem humana indiget ad hoc quod conjungatur Deo,
sensibilium manuductione ... Et ideo in divino cultu necesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti, ut eis
quasi signis quibusdam mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus quibus Deo conjungitur. Et ideo
religio habet quidem interiores actus quasiprincipaleset per se ad religionempertinentes,exteriores
vero actus quasi secundarios et ad interiores actus ordinatos.' (Emphasis added.)
Ibid., 2-2.81.5. See In Boeth. De Trinitate3.2: 'Ipsa camen religio non est virtus theologica: habet
enim pro materia quasi omnes actus, ut fidei, vel virtutis alterius, quos Deo tamquam debitos ofFert;
sed Deum habet pro fine. Colere enim Deum est hujusmodi actus ut Deo debitos offerre.'
Pete! Harrison, 'Religion'and the religionsin the English Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 61fF.See In Boeth. De Trinitate 3.2: ' ... actus fidei pertinet quidem
materialiter ad religionem, sicut et aliarum virtutum, et magis in quantum fidei actus est primus
motus mencis in Deum; sed formaliter a religione distinguitur, utpote aliam rationem objecti considerans. Convenit etiam fides cum religione praeter hoc, inquantum fides est religionis causa et
principium. Non enim aliquis eligeret culcum Deo exhibere, nisi fide teneret Deum esse creatorem,
gubernatorem et remuneratorem humanorum actuum.'
Summa theologiae2-2.186.1.ad 2; Su.ad 1. See In Boeth.De Trinitate3.2: 'Sic ergo omnes actus qui bus
se homo subjicit Deo, sive sine mencis, sive corporis ad religionem pertinent.' And even further: 'et
sic diligencer consideranti apparet omnem accum bonum ad religionem pertinere.'
William T. Cavanaugh, 'The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State', Modern Theowgy11/4
(October 1995), pp. 403-4. For the sweeping character of Aquinas's understanding of religio,see
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but by no means exhaustive of it. Aquinas, relying explicitly upon Cicero,
is far more generous in the inclusion he gives to religio. It can be pagan
or Christian, private or social, as long as it directs one to the service and
reverence of God.
By che same ace, a human being both serves and worships God. For worship looks
co the excellence of God, co which reverence is due. Service, however, looks co
che subjection of the human person, who by reason of his condition is obliged co
give reverence co God. To these two aces belong all the aces char are attributed
co religion, because through all of chem the human being acknowledges the divine
excellence and his subjection co God, either by offering something co God or also
by accepting something divine'. 13

This is far more sweeping than Christian liturgical practices and specific
symbols and beliefs and is not constrained into the public/private distinction. Religi.olooks to all of the acts by which God is served and worshipped
as 'principium creationiset gubernationis rerum', whether Christian or not. 14
For Aquinas, pace Wilfred Cantwell Smith, chis virtue constituted the
fundamental meaning of religio- a good habit, not 'an activity of the soul'
and not just a 'prompting', but a developed capacity and inclinacion. 15
What is astonishing to record is the close conjunction chat Aquinas draws
between religioand sanctitas- in light of the role chat 'the sacred' will play
later in the works of Durkheim and Eliade. Sanctitas and religiodiffer not
in essence bur only in their grammar, as one might here translate ratione.
Religio (dicitur) is said to look to all of the acts by which God is served
and worshipped as 'principium creationiset gubernationis rerum' whether
Christian or not, while sanctity (dicitur) bespeaks not only divine worship
but 'the work of all of the virtues or all good works by which the human
person disposes herself for divine worship.' 16
It is here that institution entered into the ambit of Thomistic 'religio.'
Those who dedicate their entire lives to chis divine service are called religiosi, and their groupings and communities became 'religious orders' or
2-2.81+ ad 2: 'Omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem, non quasi ad
elicientem sed quasi ad imperantem; ilia aurem pertinent ad religionem eliciencem quae secundum
rarionem sua speciei pertinent ad reverenriam Dei.'
13 Summa theologiae2-2.81.3.ad 2: 'Eodem acru homo servic Deo ec colic ipsum; nam culrus respicic
Dei excellenciam, cui reverencia debetur; servitus aurem respicic subjeccionem hominis, qui ex sua
condicione obligacur ad exhibendarn reverenciam Deo. Er ad haec duo pertinent omnes actus qui
religioni accribuuncur, quia per omnes homo proresrarur divinam excellenciam ec subjeccionem sui
ad Deum, vel exhibendo aliquid ei, vel eciam assumendo aliquid divinum.'
14
Ibid., 2-2.81.3.
' 5 See Smith, Meaning and End of Religion,p. 32. See In Boeth. De Trinittlle3.2: 'religio est specialis
virtus, in accibus omnium virrucem specialem rarionem objecci considerans, scilicer Deo debirum.'
•6 Summa theologiae2-2.81.3.
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'religions'.'7 'Religion' not only denoted a virtue, but also the 'status' of
those whose vows were specified by chat virtue.
In the thirteenth century, religiocombined into a phrase chat bespoke an
Augustinian rather than a Ciceronian heritage. At least sixty-eight times,
Aquinas, following a lead taken from Augustine, joined christiana with
refigio. Indeed, he made the avowed purpose of the Summa theologiae'co
treat chose things that pertain co Christian religioin the manner chat would
be appropriate co the instruction of beginners'. 18But what was meant by this
christiana refigiowas not the institution and the set of characteristic beliefs,
symbols, or ceremonial practices of the Church, as it is so often interpreted,
bur rather something much closer co what one would today call Christian
piety or devotion. Aquinas, of course, specified 'piety' quite differently, bur
refigio remained a virtue that would govern and be expressed in practices
and devotions. For Aquinas, these latter were not religion, either severally or
collectively; they were the objects of religion. With such an understanding,
it could make perfect sense co assert that 'the highest reaches of Christian
religion consist in mercy in so far as one is speaking of exterior works;
but che interior affection of charity, whereby we are united with God,
cakes precedence over love and mercy towards our neighbor'. 19 Aquinas
never gives any indication that Christianity is one institutional religion out
of many, that religion was a genus specified into various communities of
different beliefs, practices and traditions. In fact he never groups refigio
with other traditions such as the Jewish, Muslim or pagan.
In this understanding of 'religion', John Calvin and Huldreich Zwingli
seem much closer to Aquinas. When Zwingli titled his book, Devera etfolsa
religionecommentarius, he was not distinguishing between two communities with their characteristic and divergent beliefs, symbols and practices.
He differentiated, as had Lactantius before him, between two different
attitudes cowards worship. 20 True religion is chat piety or reverence chat
emerges from the comprehensive entrustment of oneself to the true God
in faith; false religion occurs when this reverence is given to anything other
than God. 21 When John Calvin published Christianaerefigionisinstitutio in
1536,he was writing not about 'the' Christian religion - one denomination
1

7
18

1

9

Ibid., 2.81.1.ad 5 and 2-2.186.1.ad 2.
Ibid., Prologue:' ... ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent eo modo cradere secundum quod
congruit ad erudicionem incipiencium.'
Ibid., 2-2.30.4.ad 2: ' ... summa religionis Christianae in misericordia consistit quantum ad exteriora opera, interior tamen affectio caritatis, qua conjungimur deo, praeponderat et dileccioni et
1nisericordiae in proxirnos.

20
21

1

Smith, Meaning and End of Religion,pp. 27-8.
Ibid., pp. 35-6, 224 n. 83, 84. For the meaning of vera religioin Aquinas, see 2-2.81.3.sc.
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among many other religious bodies - but about Christian piety. It was
not until the nineteenth century that translations placed a definite article
before the adjective 'Christian' and brought John Calvin into the more
contemporary understanding of 'religion', one that he had never actually
shared. 22
This basic understanding of 'religion' allowed Schleiermacher to move
consistently from a defence of religion as the intuition and feeling of the
infinite in his youthful Uber der Religion to the Glaubenslehrein which
the foundational concept is piety (Frommigkeit) or the feeling of absolute
dependence. The intuition and feeling of the first identified with the piety
of the second, and he was at pains to advance this understanding against the
false attribution of religion to external forms, symbols and propositional
beliefs. Kant equated his Religion within the Limits of ReasonAlone with a
fundamental and habitual ethical orientation towards duty.
One can register the beginnings of a radical change in religio,however, by
taking a second sounding, this time among theologians of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and specifically as it was bodied forth in the massively
influential textbooks of Francisco Suarez. De virtute et statu religionis (16089) continued much of the Thomistic tradition, with religioa moral virtue,
realised in the vowed 'religious' state and sometimes modified by christiana
to indicate the fundamental habit of Christian worship and service of God
founded upon Christian faith. 23 But here one can discover also the subtle
beginnings of what will become a sea change. For Suarez contended that
the term religio- like 'fides' and 'votum' -was legitimately and 'customarily
applied (tribui so/ere) not only to internal affect, but also to the external
actions and, indeed, to the things (rebus) by which God was worshipped
as also to the doctrina that teaches such worship or ceremony'. 24 Religion
in this sense is no longer simply a virtue; it is also both things such as
external ritual and ceremonial objects and the teachings and the beliefs that
instruct about their appropriate use. Scripture is cited for the legitimacy
22

Wilfred Cantwell Smith has it exactly right: 'To the author and those who first read it the title
of Zwingli's book meant, "An essay on genuine and spurious piety"; and Calvin's, something like
"Grounding in Christian piety"' (Meaningand End of Religion,p. 37).
23 Francisco Suare2, S.J., 'Tractatus primus: De natura et essentia virtutis religionis', in Opusde virtute
et statu religionis,in Operaomnia, editio nova, vol. XIII (Paris: Louis Vives, 1859), 3-76. The first
two volumes, dealing with the virtue of religion, and XIV of the Operaomnia, were published by
1609, while the second two volumes were published posthumously at Lyons in 1623 and 1625.See
Joseph de Guibert, S.J., TheJesuits:Their Spiritual Doctrineand Practice:A HistoricalStudy, trans.
William J. Young, S.J. (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1972), p. 268.
24
Suare2, 'De natura et essentia virtutis religionis', 8a: ' ... advercere oportet nomen religionis non
solum interno affectui, sed etiam exterioribus actionibus, imo et rebus quibus Deus colitur, rribui
solere, atque etiam docuinae quae talem cultum vel caeremoniam docet.'
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of chis extension as is Clement of Alexandria ('religioest actio quae Deum
sequitur'), but not Aquinas or the medieval doctors.
Thus, Suarez subsumes what Aquinas had called the acts or objects of
religion into religion itself, and in doing so, he opens up religioto the cultural and anthropological meanings and inquiries chat will constitute its
character in modernity. He enters chis extension of the meaning of religi.o
as one already in common usage. Religion's objects have come to constitute
religion. Harrison would trace to the English Enlightenment the emergence
of religioas denoting the externals of worship and practice. But this attribution should go back farther, at least to the major influence chat mediated
scholasticism to modern philosophy, Francisco Suarez, 'Doctor Eximius'. 25
Because of his continuous presence within the textbook tradition, Suarez
exercised a profound influence on subsequent centuries.
One must note also chevirtuallycontemporary NaturalandMoralHistory
of the Indies (1590) by the contentious polymath Jose de Acosta. Acosta took
the understanding of religioas 'the belief system chat results in ceremonial
behavior', as 'chat which is used (que usan) in their rites' by the American
indigenous peoples. It was also around this period that the credal content
of religion could be somewhat separated from ceremonies, and so it was
emphasised chat 'religion' could substitute for 'faith' and become a genus as Jonathan Z. Smith so helpfully traces. Now religion as a generic system of
beliefs and practices could break down into the constituent species of'Christianity, Mohametanism, Judaism and Idolatry'. The palm for advancing
into popular reading the plural of'religion' in chis sense, i.e., for 'religions',
seems to go to the redoucable Samuel Purchas with the 1613appearance of
the first volume of PurchasHis Pilgrimage;or,Relationsof the Worldand the

ReligionsObservedin ALLAgesand PlacesDiscoveredfrom the Creationunto
thisPresent... In a year, following hard on its heels was Edward Brerewood's
EnquiriesTouchingthe Diversityof Languagesand Religionsthroughthe Chiefe
Partsof the World (1614).26 Here, we are much closer to modernity.

'5

'

6

Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., Medieval Philosophy(New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 356-7.
Maurer cites Suarez's presence in the education of Descartes and among the philosophical influences
on Leibniz, Schopenhauer and Christian Wolff.
See Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious', in Mark C. Taylor, ed., Critical Termsfor
ReligiousStudies (Chicago: Universiry of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 271-2. But the older usage did
not die. Even when Samuel Johnson's Dictionaryof the Englishlanguage or the first edition of the
Encydopa,diaBritannica took up 'religion', they bespoke the reverence that was due to God or the
reasonable service of God. This was to continue in some variation the differentiation that obtained
since the Middle Ages between the habit of religion and the objects - ceremonials, adoration, cult,
and all of the virtues that religiocould comprehensively command 'insofar as they were directed to
the service and honor of God' (Summa theologiae2-2.186.1.ad 2; Su.ad 1.).
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A third sounding can be made as we come back co Eliade's an nus mirabiiis.
Durkheim and Freud, Pettazoni, Jung and Schmidt are not talking about
a particular human virtue or its characteristic functions. Religion was not
a virtue; it had become 'things' - many of which it used to govern - but
'things' in the sense of discrete units such as sacrifice and vows, moral practices and rituals and commitments, and also myths, beliefs and symbols
indicative of or common to a particular communiry. Religion was a congeries of such 'things', marked by the sacred or by taboo or by the fearful.
One religious system of such beliefs and practices could and should be distinguished from another; its identiry required it. And the conjoined units
owned as sacred or interdicting were co be distinguished from another realm
of 'things', chat of the profane. Like 'science' and 'arc', 'religion' changed
from a qualiry of the human being or of a communiry co a territory of
particular things, external things chat could be studied by sciences such as
anthropology, sociology, psychology and ethnology to determine a specific
culcure or cast of human character.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith describes - will subsequencly question - chis
understanding of religion in its new form:
Ir is customary nowadays to hold char there is in human life and society something
distinctive called 'religion'; and chat chis phenomenon is found on earth ar present
in a variety of minor forms, chiefly among outlying or eccentric peoples, and in a
half-dozen or so major forms. Each of these major forms is also called 'a religion',
and each one has a name: Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and so on. 27

When one spoke of' the Christian religion', similariry of phrase hid the
profound difference between the sense carried by' religion' in the nineteenth
century and the understanding it bore for Aquinas and Calvin, Zwingli and
even Suarez. Eliade's five authors might disagree on how religion should
be further specified or what was worshipped, but they would agree that
they were not dealing with human qualities, but with an aggregation of
particular units.
Thus, in Durkheim's logistical reading, 'alchough religion is a whole
composed of parts - a more or less complex system of myths, dogmas, rites,
and ceremonies- they operate as ifit formed a kind of indivisible entiry'. 28
17
18

Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Meaning and End of Religion,p. 15.
Emile Durkheim, ElementaryFormsof ReligiousLife, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press,
1995),p. 33. 'At the foundation of all systems of belief and all cults, there must necessarily be a certain
number of fundamental representations and a mode of ritual conduct that, despite the diversity of
forms that the one and the other may have caken on, have the same objective meaning everywhere,
and everywhere fulfill the same functions. It is these enduring elements that constitute what is
eternal and human in religion. They are the whole objective content of the idea that is expressed
when religion in general is spoken of.' Ibid., p. 4.
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Durkheim's world bifurcates into the sacred and profane, and 'when a
certain number of sacred things have relations of coordination and subordination with one another, so as to form a system chat had a certain
coherence and does not belong to any other system of the same sort, then
the beliefs and the rites, taken together constitute a religion'. 29 Thus it was
chat 'religious phenomena fall into two basic categories: belief and rices.
The first are states of opinion and consist of representations; the second are
particular modes of action. Between all of these two categories of phenomena lies all chat separates chinking from doing.' 30 What makes Buddhism
a religion, Durkheim argued, is chat 'in the absence of gods, it accepts the
existence of sacredthings, namely the four Noble Truths and the practices
chat are derived from chem'.31
In Totem and Taboo,Freud lays out two basic components of religion,
what will emerge in other works as compulsive practices whose motivations
are hidden and deeply treasured beliefs about powerful realities whose justifications are equally unconscious.32 The most primitive form of these
compulsive practices lay with taboo and exogamy, while the original focus
of fear and reverence was the totem. 33 For Raffaele Pettazzoni, religion was
itself one component within the more general category of culture. 'Religion is historically a form of culture and cannot be understood save in the
framework of chat particular culture of which it is a part, and in organic
association with its other forms, such as art, myth, poetry, philosophy,
economic, social, and political structure.' 34 Each of these denoted a set of
organically interrelated things. As one spoke of Greek art or poetry constituted by their own proper objects, so one could speak of Greek religion in
contrast with ocher religions and of religion in general in contrast with the
ocher territories of art, myth, poetry and philosophy.
With almost scholastic precision, Wilhelm Schmidt defined religion
.both as beliefs and objects. 'Subjectively, it [religion] is the knowledge and
consciousness of dependence upon one or more transcendental, personal
19
Jl

JJ

J4

Ibid., p. 38.
Jo Ibid., p. 34.
J' Ibid., p. 35 (emphasis added).
Sigmund Freud, Totemand Taboo,trans. James Srrachey, with a biographical introduction by Peter
Gay (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989). pp. 36-7, 109-10; 97ff.
'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (1907) had already charred the parallels between religious
practices and obsessive neurosis, while TheFutureof an Illusionwould point up the analogies between
religious ideas and Meyerr's amenria, 'a state of acute hallucinatory confusion'. Sigmund Freud, The
Futureof an lllusio11,trans. James Srrachey (New York: W. W Norton, 1961), pp. 55-6, cf. esp.n. 5.
Raffaele Pertazroni, 'Introduction to the History of Greek Religion,' in his Essayson the Historyof
Religio11s,
trans. H.J. Rose (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 68. Ugo Bianchi points our that with La
religioneprimitiva in SardegnaPettazzoni indicates his shift from classical archaeology to the history
of religions. Ugo Bianchi, 'Pettazroni, Raffaele (1883-1959)', in Mircea Eliade, ed., The Encyclopedia
of Religion(New York: Macmillan, 1986), vol. II, p. 261.
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powers, to which man stands in a reciprocal relation. Objectively, it is the
sum of the outward actions in which it is expressed and made manifest, as
prayer, sacrifice, sacraments, liturgy, ascetic practices, ethical prescriptions,
and so on.' 35 The insistence upon reciprocal personal relations made it
necessary for Schmidt to exclude early Buddhism. Later Buddhism would
make the cut because it 'has included in its wide-reaching system innumerable personal deities' .36 Finally, in Wandlungenund SymbolederLibido,Carl
Jung takes for granted that religion is a composite of its own set of things,
in contrast with 'things of a wholly other sort than religion'. It is a world
of proper religious myths, rituals, hymns, dogmas and symbols, with 'its
object, original sin'.37 These components gave religion its unique concentration and differentiation from the sets of other objects. In fact, part of the
contemporary problem lies in a shift from one to the other: 'To the degree
that the modern mind is passionately concerned with anything and everything rather than religion, religion and its prime object- original sin - have
mostly vanished into the unconscious. That is why, today, nobody believes
in either ... ' 38 It is religion that presents as religious objects or symbols
the transformed contents of the unconscious, transposing and transforming them into religion's own world of objects or images. 39 '1n religion, the
regressive reanimation of the father-and-mother imago is organized into a
system.' 40
In this generic constitution of religion as a set of particularly designated
units, contrasting with the parallel territories of art or science or even politics, religion became a subset of human culture. One studies religion in
order to come to understand something about the character of human
beings themselves, something about a particular human culture. Religion
has become the cultural evidence for the human. Durkheim spoke for
35

Wilhelm Schmidt, S.Y.D., The Originand Growthof Religion:Factsand Theories,trans. H.J. Rose
(New York: Dial Press, 1931), p. 2.
36 Ibid.
37 Wandlungenund Symboleder Libido was translated as Psychology
of the Unconscious:
A Study of the
Transformations
and Symbolismsof the Libido, trans. Beatrice M. Hinkle (New York: Dodd, Mead
and Company, 1947), p. 81. For the psychological truth of symbols and myths that are 'in actual
truth ... misleading', seep. 262.
38 C. J. Jung, Symbolsof Transformation,Bollingen Series no. 20, trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York:
Pantheon, 1956), p. 72. This is a translation of Symboleder Wandlung(Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1952),
which is itself a fourth revised edition of Wandlungenund Symbok der Libido. For this ciration in
the earlier work, see pp. 81-2. Jung continues: 'This disbelief in the devilishness of human nature
goes hand in hand with the blank incomprehension of religion and its meaning. The unconscious
conversion of instinctual impulses into religious activity is ethically worthless, and often no more
than an hysterical outburst.'
39 Jung, Symbolsof Transformation,
p. 59; Psychology
of the Unconscious,pp. 72-3. See Jung's previous
discussion of the writing of Miss Miller and the narrative of the Book of Job.
40
Jung, Psychology
of the Unconscious,p. 99. For further projections into dogma, seep. 120.
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almost all when he said that this study of religious phenomena in its structures and developments is finally 'to explain a present reality that is near to
us and th us capable of affecting our ideas and actions. That reality is man. ' 41
That is the reason that Jonathan Z. Smith can say so flatly, "'Religion" is an
anthropological not a theological category' and insist that the history of
'religion' prior to the sixteenth century is irrelevant to contemporary
usage.42 Instead of inquiry into what is an appropriate response to the creative action and reality of God, there would be arguments about the cultures
that constituted religion and its focus, whether god or gods needed to be
involved in religion at all. And this brings this essay to its second question:
how did this understanding of 'religion' enter into the atheistic discussion
of these last centuries?

ATHEISM

AND

THE

SCIENTIFIC

STUDY

OF RELIGION

The proponents of the newly formulated scientific studies of religion, as
represented by Eliade's Five, were drawn into the conflict about Christian
belief, especially that about the existence of God, as each of the warring
sides looked to these studies to supply it with new resources. Max Millier,
who coined the tide of the 'science of religion', claimed that the studies
of the Vedas strengthened his Christianity, while E. B. Tylor believed that
these 'scientific inquiries gave support to his personal stance of agnostic
religious skepticism'. 43 Already in 1870, Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury)
had brought out The Originof Civilizationand the First Conditionof Man,
proposing atheism as the initial and most primitive stage of religious belief
and supplying this stage as an aboriginal prologue to Auguste Comte's
famous triad. Appealing to the religious culture found among primitives,
Lubbock found this Uratheismusnot in an explicit denial of the reality of
any god, but in the absence within these earliest cultures of all religion. 44
41

42

43
44

Durkheim, ElementaryForms,p. 1. Durkheim strongly advances the position that all religions are
founded on the reality of the human. 'Even the most bizarre or barbarous rites and the strangest
myths translate some human need and some aspect oflife, whether social or individual.' Ibid., p. 2.
Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious', p. 269. These settlements made in the generic
notion of religion, as represented by Eliade's five figures, had been secured comfortably by the turn
of the century and have had their own pervasive and substantial presence within contemporary
theological discourse. One has only to read, for example, the Nature of Doctrine:Religionand
Theol.ogyin a PostliberalAge by the distinguished theologian, Professor George Lindbeck, one of
the most influential works in theology ro appear in the 1980s, to find religion specified by three
different kinds of'things': propositional statements and beliefs, symbols and feelings, terms and the
grammar for their use and practice.
Daniel L. Pals, Seven Theoriesof Religion(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 8.
Schmidt, Origin and Growth of Religion,pp. 58-9. Lubbock enlarged Comte's triad generously by
such additions as fetishism, totemism, shamanism and anthropomorphism.
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This was to counter the earlier assertion of major figures from the German
Enlightenment, such as Herder and Lessing, that religion constituted a
universal constituent of the human spirit, and, more recently, the claim of
Christopher Meiners's AllgemeineKritischeGeschichteder Religion(1806-7)
that 'no people has ever existed without a religion'. Meiners was one of
the first modern writers to make such an assercion.45 By 1912, the lists were
drawn. How one analysed religion had come to affect heavily the credibility
of theistic convictions. How was this analysis to be done? Religion was no
longer a subset of virtue, bur of culcure, and, as a subset of culture, it was
to be studied according to the path mapped out by the exemplary studies
of culcure. le was to busy itself with origins. Eliade recognised chat during
the latter half of the nineteenth century:
all Western historiography was obsessed with the quest of origins. .. Grear scholars
wrote about the origin oflanguage, of human societies, of art, of institutions, of the
lndo-Aryan races, and so on ... chis search for the origins of human institutions
and cultural creations prolongs and completes the naturalist's quest for the origin
of species, the biologist's dream of grasping the origin oflife, the geologist's and the
astronomer's endeavor to understand the origin of the Earth and the Universe. 46

This focus upon origins was something of a departure from an
eighteenth-century past. In his Natural History of Religion,for example,
David Hume had divided the inquiry into religion between two distinct
questions: what are the foundations in reasonof religion, and what is the
origin of religion in human nacure?47 The nineteenth century collapsed
these questions into one, and the truth about religion was co be found in
its origins.
So Durkheim attempted an understanding of contemporary religions
by 'tracing historically the manner in which they have gradually taken
shape'. 48 Origins would explain present reality. The real is not only che
underlying; it is the antecedent, and the primitive was symptomatic of
the prehistoric. So co understand religion 'we muse begin by going back
to its simplest and most primitive form'. 49 Hence Durkheim concentrates
upon the elementary forms of religion. The findings here will determine
the character of everything else:
45

46
47
48

See Seymour Cain, 'The Study of Religion: History of Study', in Eliade, ed., The Encydopediaof
Religionvol. XIV, pp. 65-6. Cain writes that Meiners was one of the first modern writers to make
this assertion, see p. 65. Christoph Meiners, AllgemeineKritischeGeschichteder Religion(Hanover:
Helwing, 1806-7), 2 vols.
Mircea Eliade, 'The Quest for the "Origins" of Religion', in The Quest, pp. 37-53.
David Hume, The Natural Historyof Religion,ed. H. E. Root (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1957), 'Author's Introduction', p. 21.
49 Ibid.
Durkheim, ElementaryForms,p. 3.
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Although religion is a whole composed of pares - a more or less complex system
of myths, dogmas, rites, and ceremonies - they operate as if it formed a kind of
indivisible entity. Since a whole can be defined only in relationship co the parts
char comprise it, a better method is co cry co characterize che elementaryphenomena
from which any religionresults,and then characterize the system produced by their
union. 50

The elementary was chat from which religion results. Freud also believed with some reserve - that one could get to the prehistoric by a study of primitives, seeing in chem 'a well-preserved picture of an early stage of our own
developmenc'Y Freud would rely upon studies done on the aborigines of
Australia, and, like The ElementaryFormsof ReligiousLife, Totemand Taboo
would assert chat 'it is highly doubtful whether any religion, in the shape
of a worshipof higherbeings,can be attributed to them'.52 Boch Durkheim
and Freud assert the worship of the totem as primordial and seminal of all
religion. 53Durkheim is content co establish chis as face and co recognise its
origins as a surrogate for clan and community. Freud pushes beyond these
findings of what he called 'social anthropology', back to Oedipal longings
and the murder of the primal father. For psychoanalysis of the origins has
shown chat 'at bottom God is nothing other than an exalted father ... Thus,
while the totem may be the first form of father-surrogate, the god will be
a later one.' 54
Jung's Wandlungenund SymboLeder Libido also locates the origins of
divinity within the projecting human subject: 'Psychologically understood,
the divinity is nothing else than a projected complex of representations
which is accentuated in feeling according to the degree of religiousness
of the individual, so God is to be considered as the representative of a
certain sum of energy (libido).' 55 At this stage of the development of Jung's
psychological inquiries, God is the construction of the libido, fixed upon

10

Ibid., pp. 33-4 (emphasis added). This determines the decision of Durkheim co focus upon primitive
religions, specifically those of Australia, 'because the facts are simpler, the relations between them
are more apparent'.
1' Freud, Totemand Taboo,p. 3- One must, however, recognise that at least theoretically Freud was
aware that 'it is never possible co decide without hesitation how far their present-day conditions and
opinions preserve the primaeval past.' Ibid., p. 128.
12 Ibid., p. 4 (emphasis added).
H Ibid., p. 126. Freud accepts as his point of departure the statement ofW Wundt: 'at some time totemic
culture everywhere paved the way for a more advanced civilization, and, thus, that it represents a
transitional stage between the age of primitive men and the era of heroes and gods.'
14 Freud, Totemand Taboo,pp. 182-3.
55 Jung, Psychology
of the Ur1cor1scious,
p. 71. 'This energy, therefore, appears projected (metaphysically)
because it works from the unconscious outwards, when it is dislodged from there, as psychoanalysis
shows.'
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the mother rather than the facher.56 This search for origins, thus, as in
Freud or Durkheim or Jung, could counter with rival theories of origins
any claimed stability of belief in what the Christian could recognise as God.
Or it could constitute a support. The affirmation of the existence of
God could also search for its evidences in the practices, symbols and beliefs
chat make up the texture of 'religion'. Wilhelm Schmidt's Der Ursprung
der Gottesideecook up Andrew Lang's theory of high gods, i.e., of supreme
beings chat predated in every primitive culture both animism and totem ism:
Comparing the primitive cultures with the later ones we may lay down the general
principle that in none of the latter is the Supreme Being to be found in so clear,
so definite, vivid and direct a form as among the peoples belonging to the former
[i.e., to primitive cultures] ... This Supreme Being is to be found among all the
peoples of the primitive culture, not indeed everywhere in the same form or the
same vigor, but still everywhereprominent enough to make his dominant position
indubitable.57
Thus an Urmonotheismuslies at the origins ofallsubsequencvariations of the
object of religion, a supreme being chat is no more difficult for the primitive
mind co infer than for it co recognise in anything made the necessity for a
maker. Monotheism is at the origins, not the end, of human development.
Bue against chis primitive monotheism, Pettazoni was in 'repeated polemics'
and saw monotheism emerge as a 'revolution against polycheism'. 58 Thus
he identified the sky-god (Rangi) as primordial or superior in the Maori
pantheon, one who stands behind and is ultimately sublimated and raised
to a higher plane as Io, the uncreated beginning of all chings. 59
56

Ibid., p. 474. 'We have learned in the course of chis investigation chat the pare of the libido which
erects religious structures is in the last analysis fixed on the mother, and really represents chat
tie through which we are permanently connected with our origin ... As we have seen, this libido
conceals itself in countless and very heterogeneous symbols.' This reading becomes clearer when one
considers the centrality that Jung, at this stage, gave to incest desires and fantasies. In women this
desire shows itself in che Father-Imago, 'for the idea of the masculine creative deity is a derivation,
analytically and historically psychologic of the Father-Imago and aims, above all, to replace the
discarded infantile father transference in such a way that for che individual che passing from che
narrow circle of che family inco che wider circle of human socie1:ymay be simpler or made easy.'
Ibid., pp. 55-6.
57 Schmidt, Origin and Growthof Religion,p. 257.
8
5 Bianchi, 'Petta2roni, Raffaele', vol. II, p. 262.
59 Raffaele Petta2zoni, 'Io and Rangi', in Essays011 the Historyof Religions,trans. H.J. Rose (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 42: 'It appears then that so lofty an attribute as omniscience also proves to be
deeply rooted in the sky-natured substance of che Maori Supreme Being. On the whole it is Rangi
the Sky who stands at the back of Io the Supreme Being. Lofty though che idea of lo is both in
religion and speculation, its foundations lie in che nature worship of a sky-god. Io is in theory the
universal cosmic principle, and as such the creator of Rangi and Papa and of the gods in che Maori
pantheon. Bue in the lase analysis lo is Rangi himself sublimated and raised co a higher plane. This
substantial identity is reflected, as above shown, not only in belief, but, what is more important, in
ritual and religion.' For Io as the 'uncreated beginning of all things', seep. 37.
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Thus, the quest for origins awakened a question that had hitherto been
unknown in the West: how necessary was 'God' or some such figure for
what had come to be called 'religion'? If Western thought had disposed of
the medieval virtue of religion, could one not also dispose of what had been
its purpose? Both E. B. Tylor and George Frazer had found religion without
god. Religion, for Tylor, was 'belief in spiritual beings', and ancient peoples
reasoned to these individual spirits within each thing. Gradually 'religion'
developed from animism to the gods of polytheism. Frazer began with the
personal and impersonal forces conjured by magic and took from William
Robertson Smith the worship of the totem as the original foundation of
all religion. Religion emerged out of magic as the human means of control
moved from laws of contact and imitation to pleading and vows offered
to win over the supreme spirits or gods. 60 Spirits, forces, totems or gods,
supreme god - the question which the inquiry into origins posed to the
religious believer was far more comprehensive: did religion with its idea
of god arise out of the self-revelation of god or did god arise as a cultural
creation of human beings - a creation one could trace in the evolutionary
progress of the idea? The pedigree of the term and the primordial character
of its referent were called upon to settle the issue of the truth of fundamental
theological claims. What was at the beginning became definitive.
Why? Two immediate reasons suggest themselves to explain why the
origins and character of the gods told directly upon the arguments for the
existence of God: the argument from universal consent and the argument
from the primordial revelation described in Genesis.

Universalconsent
Design in the physical universe had furnished the principal evidence for
the affirmation of the existence of God by thinking men in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, an affirmation grounded on discoveries advanced
by the greatest scientific minds of this enlightened period such as Newton
and Boyle and incorporated into the pervasive physico-theologies to which
all the sciences were expected to contribute. In the nineteenth century,
however, this justification of religious belief was yielding to three factors: the
growing autonomy of the physical sciences as insisted upon by such as Pierre
Simon de Laplace; the reserve about any extension of theoretical knowledge
beyond objects of possible experience with David Hume and Immanuel
Kant; and - most influentially - the evolutionary etiology of what had
60

Pals, Seven Theoriesof Religion,pp. 36-7.
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been taken as contrived design. The patterns in nature could no longer
furnish in so unchallenged a fashion the corroboration and even the warrant
for grounded religious belief Charles Darwin, as paradigmatic a figure in
the late nineteenth century as Isaac Newton had been in the eighteenth,
recognised that a nail had been driven into a coffin: 'The old argument
from design in Nature as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so
conclusive, fails now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. ' 61
Foundational religious reflection in the West shifted from nature to
human nature, from the patterns found in one to the exigencies demanded
by the other. Now God was not to explain design, but to make the ethical
enterprise possible or human history intelligible. Otherwise there was only
absurdity, mindless and ungrounded affirmations. To affirm the reality of
God became, in Kant's formulation, a 'subjective necessity', a postulate
whose denial would leave human beings with categorical commands whose
attainment could only be haphazard and random. But the great classical
atheists of the nineteenth century such as Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and
Freud, took up the argument precisely at this point, at the philosophical
appeals to human nature as warrant for the affirmation of the existence of
God. The case was read exactly in reverse. Not only did humanity not need
God for the coherence of its development, but the progress of the human
entailed the denial of God in any recognisable reading of that term. The
corruption of the one became the necessary condition for the generation
of the ocher. The ethical or social advance of humanity demanded chat it
claim for human beings themselves the excellence chat they had historically
projected onto an imaginary subject.
At the same time, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
century, there was another shift in the focus of fundamental thinking.
Major thinkers in greater numbers were looking for the foundations of
all warranted assertions not so much in a prior analysis of human cognition or epistemologies or phenomenologies of spirit- a nineteenth-century
enterprise that reaches for its beginning back to John Locke. Their search
increasingly was turning to language and action as fundamental, to various
forms of semantics and pragmatics and existentialisms that found these to
be 'the house of being'. Generically, chis constituted a turn to human experience in its various forms of expression as foundational, as that expression
is embodied in words or in deeds. Semantics and pragmatics were increasingly seen as prior and fundamental to analyses of human consciousness
and, even more, of the nature of things.
61

Charles Darwin, TheAutobiographyof CharlesDarwin and SelectedLetters,ed. Francis Darwin (New
York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 63.
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As John Locke had prophetically anticipated the shift of Western foundational chinking co epistemologies, so Giovanni Battista Vico had anticipated the massive shifts chat would occur in the lace nineteenth century from concerns about cognition as foundational co language and
action. For Vico insisted chat human beings can adequately know - have
scienza about - not what confronts chem in nature or in consciousness,
but only what they have made. 62 Culture, then, becomes all-important whether literary and artistic products or social and religious practices and
institutions.
Thus the semantic and pragmatic turn in foundational chinking was
somewhat mirrored in theological reflection by a turn cowards the scientific
study of religion. This turn did not counter, but transposed, the concern
of the previous period for warrant either co assert or co deny the reality of
a transcendent, even Christian, God.
As the nineteenth century advanced, then, the conviction was declining chat either contrived designs within nature or the exigencies of human
nature could ground a reasonable assertion of the reality of God. Bue there
was still another 'topic' from which arguments for the existence of God
had classically derived strength and credibility since the dawn of civilisation: the argument from the universal consent of humankind. Belief in
the divine had been recognised as always and universally a part of human
convictions, and chis had been philosophically recognised as celling from
the time of Plato's Laws63 or Ariscocle's De Caelo.64 Like the corresponding
62

Gianbattista Vico, The New Science, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1968). In this wider sense, scienw nuova embraces both philosophy and
philology. See 'Introduction', F3. The philologians include grammarians, historians, and critics 'who
have occupied themselves with the study of the languages and the deeds of peoples,' Book I, #138-40.
63 Plato, The laws I0.886a-888d. In Plato's laws, the Athenian argues chat the existence of the divine
is 'the most certain of all realities', advancing stories and prayers and sacrifices as evidence against
chose whose 'wane of faith in the stories heard so often in earliest infancy, while still at the breast,
from their mothers and nurses - stories, you may say, crooned over them, in sport and in earnest,
like spells - and heard again in prayers offered over sacrifices in conjunction with the spectacle
which gives such incense delight co the eye and ear of children, as it is enacted at a sacrifice, che
spectacle of our parents addressing their god, which assured belief in their existence, in earnest
prayer and supplication for themselves and their children. Then again, at rising and setting of the
sun and moon, they have heard and seen the universal prostrations and devotions of mankind,
Greek and non-Greek alike, in all che various circumstances of evil fortune and good, with their
implication chat gods are no fictions, but the most certain of realities and their being beyond che
remotest shadow of doubt.'
64 Aristocle, De Caelo1.3.27ob5-8. In the problematic method of Aristotle, the same consensus, found
in che usages of religion, served to confirm astronomical theories about che primary body: 'Our
theory seems to confirm experience and to be confirmed by it. For all human beings have some
conception of the nature of the gods, and all who believe in the existence of gods at all, whether
barbarian or Greek, agree in allotting che highest place to the deity, surely because they suppose chat
immortal is linked with immorcal and regard any ocher supposition as inconceivable.'
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evidence from nature and human nature, universal consent would vary chemacically as it ran through two thousand years of intellectual history in the
Wesc.65
Charles Darwin maintained chat by the middle of the nineteenth century,
with the demise of design and morality as bases of theistic appeal, universal
consensus was the lase argument left. 'Ac the present day, che most usual
argument for the existence of an intelligent God is drawn from the deep
inward conviction and feelings which are experienced by most persons.'
Darwin could not share these feelings. 'le may be truly said chat I am like
a man who has become colour-blind, and the universal belief by men of
the existence of redness makes my present loss of perception of not the
least value as evidence.' The issue of divine existence is joined at 'universal
belief', and Darwin is prophetic in assessing the damage chat the study of
religion will work. 'This argument would be a valid one if all men of all
races had the same inward convictions of the existence of one God; but we
know chat chis is very far from being the case.' 66 That is why both sides
of chis controversy looked to the emerging scientific study of religion for
resources and confirmation. Was the consensus universal and sempiternal
or was it at lease primitive and prehistoric?
Fundamental revelation

There was a second reason and a more theological one why the scientific
study of religion figured critically in the rhetoric for and against atheism.
Genesis had caught chat a primordial self-revelation of God cook place
with the creation of humanity, a revelation believed by Christians co be
brought to its fullness finally in Jesus Christ. The various denominations
of Christian faith claimed co be responses co chat revelation. Now, just
as contemporary physicists expect to find now in the cosmos the residual radiation chat bespeaks the 'big bang' of some sixteen billion years
ago, so the credibility of the scriptures was co be confirmed or denied
65

66

The argument from universal consent will vary according to the parameters offered by a particular
philosophy, but even when the doctrines and practices of the popular cults were dismissed as absurd
by, for example, the Epicureans, this school would still assert chat belief in the gods has not been
established by authority, custom or law, but rests on the unanimous and abiding consensus of
humankind. The Epicureans traced this universal belief to an internal, self-justifyingpro/epsis, while
the Stoics, acknowledging its cogency and connecting it with the ritual practices of divination and
the public recognition of epiphanies, credited its origins to the self-manifestation of the internal
rationality of the universe. Even the New Academy accepted universal consensus as a tradition
within the Roman Republic. Again, religion bore to consciousness the universality of belief in the
divine, and this had stood as evidence for the affirmation of God for two millennia. For these
divergent understandings of universal consensus, see Michael J. Buckley, S. J.,Motion and Motions
God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), Part 11,pp. 89-156.
Darwin, Autobiography,p. 65 (emphasis added).
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by what one discovered in religion's beginnings. Not chat one necessarily
expected to uncover primordial revelation, but at least to come upon the
effects of that revelation in the history of religions. Joseph J. Baierl, the
American translator of Wilhelm Schmidt, was typical of the apologists of
that time:
The apologist's task is, indeed, a manifold one: to present the essence, scope, and
content of primitive revelation; to show, in the light of prehistory, anthropology,
and ethnology, that the earliest known men were capable of receiving such a
revelation; to point out how many branches of natural science actually confirm its
historiciry; and, finally, to reconstruct its fate after men's fall and dispersion.

And what must Baierl's reconstruction expect to prove?
Even though the light of revelation dimmed as the race grew, and even though the
darkness of paganism practically extinguished it, yet it continued to glow among
those peoples who remained at the most primitive levels of culture; until at last
it was entrusted to the keeping of God's chosen people, Israel, and thus became
man's common heritage once more. 67

In a very different vein, Pettazzoni finds Schmidt's Urmonotheismus 'a
return, by a different way, to the old position of the doctrine of revelation'. 68
So the scientific study of religion, whether as resource or as threat, was
inescapably drawn into the controversies about the existence of God. If the
inquiry into primordial or primitive religions disclosed no presence of an
Urmonotheismus, not only did the argument from universal consent fail,
but the Judeo-Christian affirmation of a primordial revelation was read as
unsustainable.
Not only were Eliade's Five inducted into these partisan conflicts, they
were marked by the colours under which they enlisted. Their religious affiliations came to accredit or discredit their study of religions. Eliade noted
chis with Wilhelm Schmidt: 'Schmidt, though a very able scholar, was also a
Catholic priest, and the scientific world suspected him of apologetic intencions.'69 On the other hand, Gaston Richard- once the disciple Durkheim
thought the best qualified to be his successor- bitterly criticized the Master
for the injection of 'dogmatic atheism' into his sociology of religion. Thus:
it becomes all che more necessary to show that where religion exercises the maximum influence on sociery, as among primitive peoples, it manages entirely without
67

68
69

Joseph J. Baierl, 'Introduction' to his translation of Primitive Religion by Wilhelm Schmidt
(St. Louis, MO: Herder, 1939),
p. iv. Actually this work is an amalgam of Schmidt's writings done
by the translator, adapted to Baierl's series of apologetic works.
Raffaele Pettazzoni, 'The Formation of Monotheism', in Essaysin the Historyof Religions,p. 4.
Mircea Eliade, 'The Quest for the "Origins" of Religion', pp. 45-6.
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the idea of God. The essay on values gives us the last word on the religious philosophy of Durkheim but it is the task of Lesformes elementairesco present the
scientific proof.7°

RELIGION

AND

THEOLOGY:

FINAL

REFLECTIONS

Bue no matter how differently the story of origins could have been cold,
evaluated and employed, I wonder if something far more profound did not
get lost in the translation between the Middle Ages' and the contemporary
understanding and scientific study of' religion'. And I wonder if what got
lost was 'God' - God as the purpose, and, in this way, the specification
of religio.Christianity believes chat God gave human life not simply itself
and things created to enhance it, but God gave Himself For Aquinas,
religion occurred as a virtue within an individual or a community when
one apperceived something of chis and gave oneself to God in some way, as
through vow or sacrifice or prayer. Religiothus bespoke God as specifying
purpose and. cook its own shape from what was appropriately rendered co
God - so much so chat Aquinas could say chat the whole purpose of his
Summa theologiaeis co treat chose things chat pertain to Christian religion.7'
Much of the scientific study of religion stood religion on its head. It
turned the focus of religioupon human beings, with the symbols, beliefs,
practices indicating stages in their development, and with God or the gods
subsumed as yet another indicator of human culture and its evolvemenc.
Religion, as Jonathan Z. Smith insists, became an anthropological category.
When God is assessed primarily as one more unit within a congeries of
cultural units and criteria, the issue of atheism has already been engaged
and seeded. The god that is one more thing does not exist. The god chat
obtains his intrinsic interest and importance because of the light he sheds
upon human life does not exist. God is either incomprehensibly absolute in
His being and in His goodness and so adored in His self-communication,
or God is not at all. It remained only for the inherent contradiction of such
a setclement to work itself out dialectically in the explicit negation of what
had already been implicicly denied.
But a Christian theologian need not be satisfied chat this is the end
of the road for rheology and the scientific study of religion. Could religion - even understood as chis congeries of individual units specified by the
70
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G. Richard, 'Dogmatic Atheism in the Sociology of Religion', in Durkheim on Religion:a selection
of readings with bibliography by W. S. F. Pickering (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975),
pp. 254, 270-2.
Summa theologiae1. Prologus.
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sacred - could religion not also be a productive theological category, i.e.,
could it not offer subject matter for inquiry that is precisely theological?
Could the scientific study of religion disclose something about God, not
simply about human culture? If the Christian finds, for example, the classic
Pauline signs of the Spirit of God - love, joy, peace, patience, kindness,
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control - is it not of theological
interest to inquire what presence in this religion has fostered so sacred an
atmosphere? 72 And cannot the Christ of Christianity- classically the norma
normans non normata - illumine rather than universally be set in competition with what is discovered in the scientific study of religion? Christian
theology might well attend to such a study, to seek not so much data about
human culture but quite explicitly what it can learn of God.
Nostra aetate, for example, recognised that women and men have perennially questioned the various religions of the world about God, taken up
with a haunting search: 'What is that ultimate and unutterable mystery
which engulfs our being, and whence we take our rise, and whither our
journey leads us?' From the dawn of humanity, it maintains, there has
emerged 'a certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the
course of things and over the events of human life'. 73 Do Christian theologians - precisely in their recognition both of the normative character
of God's revelation in Christ and also of the 'lives of these people with
a profound religious sense' - have nothing to learn about God from the
centuries of that experience?
Such theological attention and inquiry could well be extended to the
world religions of our own time. Medieval theology could search the newly
discovered books of Aristotle and Averroes and use neo-Platonic Oionysius
to learn something of God. Is there nothing for us to learn about God from
contemporary Islam? If in Hinduism, human beings have for millennia
'contemplated the divine mystery', does this contemplation have nothing
to say to our theology - not simply to ascetical disciplines, but to what
Bonaventure called our apperception of God?
One of the deleterious effects of the study of religions has been to treat
these communities and traditions of wisdom and prayer as if they were
univocal species of the one genus, 'religion', mutually exclusive species
among which one must make a choice, territories in competition with
one another. But one wonders if we have not become the victims of our
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own language, and if even the word 'religion' is inappropriate to denote the
realities or communities they name- so very different in their character as in
their claims. It is not at all evident that-with appropriate modifications but
without any of the artificial harmonies that bespeak a soft syncretism - one
could not participate fully both in a Catholic and in a Quaker community,
nor even confess oneself a Christian who has also assimilated much of the
teachings of early Buddhism. The contemporary use of the word 'religion'
would seem to forestall such an integration, but the early Church was
able to assimilate great elements out ofNeo-Platonism, Stoicism and NeoPythagorianism. We call these ancient traditions schools of philosophy, but
I wonder whether, if we came upon them today, afresh, we would not call
them religions, some even quasi-religious orders.
The word, 'religion' as we use it, may not be very helpful, introducing
commonalities and disjunctions that may be unwarranted. Nevertheless, we
are at present stuck with the term 'world religions'. Nostra aetate maintained
that 'often' - I repeat the word, often - 'they reflect a ray of that Truth that
enlightens all human beings' .74 If that is the case, it is an unrealised task for
contemporary theology - keeping the normativity of God's revelation in
Christ - to search the 'world religions' for what they can tell us about God.
Such a carefully disciplined inquiry should amplify or deepen rather than
necessarily contradict what one has learned of God from Christianity. There
is no time now to argue and nuance this suggestion with the distinctions
it obviously cries for, but only to propose that the scientific study of religion could well call the theological enterprise to an inquiry quite different
from that which obtained in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For, to
allow the final word to Nicholas Lash: 'Every Christian, and hence every
Christian theologian, is called to journey in the direction of deeper knowledge of the things of God, and the journey is a homecoming, for God is
our end as well as our beginning.'75
74 Ibid., 2, pp. 661-2.
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